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Abstract: This paper estimates the effects of federal research funding on 71 research universities.  We
focus on the number of articles published, citations per article, patents issued, and faculty salaries.  Using
a panel data set that spans from 1972 to 1994, we control for potential endogeneity and omitted variables
bias in our regressions by using a data set that links U.S. Congress members on the appropriations
committee with their undergraduate alma mater.  Alumni representation lowers the shadow price of
federal funding.  Using our preferred instrumental variables specification, we find an increase of $1
million in federal research funding (1993$) to a university results, on average, in 12 more articles, .50
more patents, and $152,015 more in total faculty salaries.  The change in citations per article is small and
imprecisely estimated.  So when the shadow price of federal research funding falls, as a first
approximation, universities buy more federal research funding and produce more but not necessarily
higher quality research output.
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For over 50 years, the U.S. federal government has systematically funded research and
development (R&D) at universities.  Its role in this regard has increased substantially during this
same period so that today federal funding accounts for approximately 60 percent of total research
funding to universities (Gieger (1993)).  Figure 1 shows the recent trends in real federal R&D
expenditure (1993$) per research and doctoral university.  From the mid-1980s, there is a slow
steady increase in average R&D funding to these universities.
Surprisingly, there is little systematic evidence on how federal funding affects
universities.
1  Panels A through D of Figure 2 depict the relationship between our four outcome
measures of universities to real federal R&D expenditures (1993$ in millions) to those schools.
2
Panels A and B examines the relationship between the number of articles published and the
number of citations per articles published, respectively. Panel A suggests a positive correlation
between articles and federal funding. The relationship is panel B is more ambiguous. Panel C
depicts the distribution of patents relative to federal funding. It suggests a weak positive
relationship.  Panel D graphs the relationship between average real faculty salary and federal
funding and again, suggests a positive relationship between these two measures. Whether these
positive correlations persist under closer scrutiny is the subject of this paper.
A notable precursor to our study is Adams and Griliches (1998).
3  Using longitudinal data
by school, they could not reject the hypothesis that the positive correlation between research
output (number of articles published and citations to those articles) and research funding is due
primarily to differences across schools.
                                                
1 In her comprehensive survey on the economics of science, Stephan (1996) has no estimate of the returns
to federal research funding of universities.
2  Data construction is discussed in Section III of the paper.
3  Drew (1985) summarizes other studies that examine the relationship between federal research funding
and various output measures.2
This paper complements and extends their research in four ways.  First, we have a larger
sample of schools and more years of data, allowing us to employ both school and year fixed
effects in our estimation.  Second, we include two new outcome measures, patent counts and
faculty salaries.
4  We study patent counts because it is comparable to studies of patent counts and
research expenditure in the private sector.  The rationale for investigating faculty salaries is to
study the pecuniary return to professors for obtaining federal research funding.  Third, we use
instruments, alumni representation on U.S. Congressional appropriations committees, to alleviate
problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias in estimating these relationships.  Finally, we
provide a new interpretation for the instrumental variables (IV) estimate of the coefficient on
expenditures when we regress an outcome measure on federal research expenditures.  The IV
estimate captures the total change in outcome when a university buys an additional unit of
federal research funding due to a change in the shadow price of funding.
Our empirical findings which control for school and year effects, endogeneity, and
omitted input bias suggest the following: for three of our four outcome measures (faculty
salaries, number of articles published and patents issued) there is a strong positive correlation
between outcome and research funding.  Under the preferred empirical specifications, an
increase of $1 million in federal research funding (1993$) to a university results in 12 more
articles, .50 more patents, and $152,015 more in total faculty salaries.  With the number of
citations per articles published, a $1 million increase in federal funding has a small and
imprecisely measured change in the number of citations per article. Thus, as a first
approximation, additional federal research funding results in more but not necessarily higher
quality research output.
                                                
4 They analyzed outcomes by academic disciplines whereas we aggregate outcomes across all disciplines.
They also study the impact on graduate enrollment.3
Using for profit firm level data and a log-linear specification, estimated elasticities of the
number of patents issued with respect to research expenditures range from .37 to .61 (Bound et
al. (1984), Pakes and Griliches (1984)).  With the same functional form, our IV estimate of the
elasticity of patents with respect to federal research funding is 1.2.
5  Since the shadow price of
federal research funding to society is approximately $1, the returns, as measured by patent
counts, to federal research funding of universities are comparable to the returns to research
expenditure in the private sector.
6
The paper is set out as follows. Section I discusses the empirical framework. Section II
provides a brief overview of the role of Congress in affecting federal research funding and how
we construct our instruments. Section III explains the other data sources.  Empirical results are
presented in Section IV and the conclusion is in Section V.
I Empirical Framework
To study the relationship between outcomes and federal research funding, consider
regressing an outcome measure on funding using school level data.
7  We have a semi-reduced
form where unmeasured inputs are be captured by the error term of the regression:
(1)  yjt￿￿ ￿￿ ￿fjt +  vjt
yjt : measure of output of production unit j at time t.
fjt : measure of an input of production unit j at time t.
vjt : error term of regression.
In the above equation, fjt is potentially correlated with the error term of the regression which
includes other inputs in the production process and production unit specific effects. With panel
                                                
5 Using data since 1980, the elasticity drops to less than one.
6 This estimate ignores spillover effects, an important focus of recent research (E.g. Henderson, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (1998), Jaffe (1989), Trajtenberg, Henderson, Jaffe (1997)).4
data on different production units, researchers control for permanent differences across
production units with fixed effects. We also control for fixed effects in our estimation and
abstract from fixed effects for the rest of this discussion.
8
To deal with the potential correlation between the fjt and the error term, researchers
HPSOR\￿DQ￿LQVWUXPHQWDO￿YDULDEOH￿HVWLPDWRU￿WR￿HVWLPDWH￿ ￿
9  There are at least two interpretations
RI￿WKH￿LQVWUXPHQWDO￿YDULDEOH￿HVWLPDWRU￿RI￿ ￿￿ IV :
 10
A.  IV estimates the total effect on yjt from an exogenous
marginal increase in fjt . It incorporates optimal adjustments
by all other inputs to the increase in fjt .
B.  IV estimates the marginal product of fjt .
The confusion about what  IV estimates is due to the lack of an economic model in which (1) is
embedded.
11  We provide an economic model to resolve this ambiguity.
Dealing with the empirical context of this paper, we model universities as profit
maximizing institutions for appropriately chosen shadow prices.  University j at time t chooses
federal funding, Fjt , and other inputs, represented as a composite input Xjt , to solve:
(2)  Max E{ Yjt ( Fjt , Xjt )Zjt – Wjt Fjt – Rjt Xjt }
E : Expectations operator at time t by school j.
Yjt : Research output at time t by school j.
Zjt : Random productivity shock to school j at time t.
Wjt : Shadow price of federal funding at time t to school j.
                                                                                                                                                          
7 This is a common strategy among empirical researchers who often regress the output of a production
process on some but not all inputs.
8 It is important to control for school effects because the peer review process allocates more federal
research funds to schools which are more productive in research (Cole and Cole (1981)).
9 Examples include Angrist (1990), Angrist and Lavy (1997), Card (1995), Cutler and Glaeser (1997),
Hoxby (1996), Kane and Rouse (1993), Mairesse and Hall (1996).
10 The classic discussion is Marschak and Andrews (1944).  Recent studies include Angrist and Krueger
(1998), Card (1998), Griliches and Mairesse (1997), Heckman (1997), Heckman and Vytlacil (1998).5
Rjt : Shadow price of other input at time t to school j.
We normalize the price of research output to one. This is without loss of generality since we
allow for individual school and time specific shadow input prices.  Any variation in the variables
of interest is due to changes in the shadow prices and productivity shocks that the school faces.
Let log Zjt = zjt + zjt , two random variables where zjt is observed before input decisions are made
and zjt is observed after input decisions are made. The means of zjt and zjt are both 0 and
uncorrelated with each other, Wjt, and Rjt.  Wjt and Rjt may be correlated.
For any variable V, let V
* denote the choice of V which solves (1). Let v and v
* denote
the log of their respective upper case variables  Using a log linear approximation to the
production function, and abstracting from fixed effects, observed log output will satisfy:
(3) yjt
*  =  a fjt
* + b xjt
* + zjt + zjt
It is convenient to parameterize the correlation between wjt and rjt as rjt =  qwjt + rjt where wjt is
uncorrelated with rjt.
12 If q is zero, the two shadow prices are uncorrelated.
Our interest is to estimate the optimal response of a school’s research output as its log
shadow price of research funding, wjt, falls, holding the other independent log shadow price, rjt,
constant.  The change in output due to a marginal change in wjt is captured by:
(4) ￿yjt
* / ￿wjt = a {￿fjt
* / ￿wjt + q￿fjt
* / ￿ rjt  } + b {￿xjt
* / ￿wjt + q￿xjt
* / ￿ rjt }
Using (4), if wjt is increased by  Zjt= {￿fjt
* / ￿wjt + q￿fjt
* / ￿ rjt  }




and our object of interest, the increase in log output is:
                                                                                                                                                          
11 Card (1998), Heckman (1997), Marschak and Andrews (1944).6
(6) ¤yjt
* =  a + b {￿xjt
* / ￿wjt + q￿xjt
* / ￿ rjt }{￿fjt
* / ￿wjt + q￿fjt
* / ￿ rjt  }
-1
(6) is the formula for the percentage change in research output induced by increasing wjt by  Zjt
such that the school is also induced to buy an additional unit of fjt.  There are two effects in (6).
The first term on the right hand side of (6) is the effect on research output due to a 1% increase
in research funding induced by  Zjt.  The second term on the right hand side of (6) is the effect
on research output due to the change in other input induced by  Zjt. This last term allows for a
cross price elasticity effect as well as an own price elasticity effect which is induced by the
correlation between the input prices.
To evaluate (6) further, we posit the following input demand system:
(7) fjt
* =   w wjt +  x rjt  +  z zjt = ( w + q  x) wjt +  x rjt  +  z zjt =  f wjt +  x rjt +  z zjt
(8) xjt




*  =  a  +  b  f￿ f
-1
Using (7) and (8) to solve out wjt:
(10) xjt
* =   f  f 
-1 fjt
*  + ( f  x -  x  f )  f 
-1 rjt + ( f  z –  z  f )  f 
-1 zjt
And, so, (3) may be rewritten as:
(11) yjt
*  =  l fjt
*  + vjt  where
l = ¤\
* = a + b  f  f 
–1 and
vjt = b ( f  x -  x  f )  f 
-1 rjt + b ( f (b
-1 + z) –  z  f )  f 
-1 zjt +  zjt
The SOLP￿RI￿WKH￿2/6￿HVWLPDWRU￿RI￿ ￿LQ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  OLS , is:
(12) SOLP￿  OLS = plim ( jt fjt




                                                                                                                                                          
12 It is important to allow for correlated shadow prices because Connolly (1997) finds a positive
relationship between internal and external funding and Payne (1998) finds a positive relationship between
private donations and government grants.7
= a + b  f  f 
–1 + cov( fjt
* , vjt )[var( fjt
* )]
-1
= a  + b  f  f 
–1 + b{( f  x -  x  f) x var(rjt) + ( f (b
-1￿ z) –  z  f)  z var(zjt)}[ f var( fjt
* )]
-1
 OLS is an inconsistent estimator of a or ¤y
*.
Consider a vector Qjt which is correlated with wjt, and uncorrelated with rjt, zjt or zjt. As a
consequence, Qjt is correlated with fjt
* and uncorrelated with vjt in (11). Let Qjt be an instrument
for fjt
*.  Since Qjt satisfies the standard properties of an instrument in (11), the plim of the
LQVWUXPHQWDO￿YDULDEOH￿HVWLPDWRU￿IRU￿ ￿￿￿ IV , is:
(13) plim  IV  = a + b  f  f 
–1 = ¤\
*
Thus, (13) implies that  IV estimates:
C.  IV estimates the change in log output when school buys an
additional unit of log funding due to a change in the
shadow price of funding.
Equation (13) applies even when productivity shocks are partially observed before input
decisions are made, i.e. var(zjt) ¹0 and when the input shadow prices are correlated, i.e. q ¹ 0.
13
That is, we allow the instrument to be correlated with the other input shadow price. Using (12)
and (13),  the relationship between  IV and  OLS is:
(14) Dl = plim  IV – plim  OLS
= b{(  x  f  -  f  x )  x var(rjt) + ( z  f  -  f (b
-1 + z))  z var(zjt)}[ f var( fjt
* )]
-1
It is difficult to interpret the determinants of the sign of Dl. Consider the special case where q
equal 0, there is no correlation between the shadow prices of inputs, and var(zjt) » 0,  the pre-
observed productivity shocks are small. Dl then becomes:
(15) Dl = b{(  x  f  -  f  x )  x var(rjt)}[ f var( fjt
* )]
-1
                                                
13 Olley and Pakes (1996) also consider the case of partially observed productivity shocks without time
varying shadow input prices.8
In this case,  f =  w and  f =  w. Convexity of the profit function implies ( x  f  -  f  x) and  f are
both negative.  Thus, the sign of Dl depends on the sign of  x, the cross price elasticity for input
fjt. The sign of  x is the same as the sign of  f , the cross price elasticity for input xjt. If  x ( f) is
positive, the substitution effect dominates the output effect due to an increase in rjt (wjt) and Dl is
positive.
14  The reverse is true when  x ( f) is negative.  The profit function also implies  f has
the same sign as  x. So when Dl > 0, a > plim  IV > plim  OLS.  Then,  IV provides a lower bound
estimate of a, the marginal product of federal funding.  On the other hand, when Dl < 0, a <
plim  IV < plim  OLS and  IV provides an upper bound measure of a.
Finally, if (11) is not log-linear, we argue by analogy that:
D.  IV estimates the change in measured outcome when a
school buys an additional unit of the measured input due to
a change in the shadow price of the measured input.
II Congress and Federal R&D Funding of Universities
To implement the IV estimator, we need instruments that are correlated with the shadow
price of federal research funding and uncorrelated with other independent shadow prices and
productivity shocks that affect a university.  Potentially, alumni representation on congressional
appropriations committees is an instrument. In 1995, approximately 14 percent of total federal
discretionary spending went towards research funding.  As a proportion of total discretionary
spending, R&D funding rose from 11.5 percent in 1980 to 13.3 percent in 1998 (NSF (1998)).
Discretionary spending provides opportunities for Congress to channel funds to particular
schools.  Below we discuss the role of the congressional appropriations committees with respect
to the federal government budget and our construction of instruments to reflect this role.
                                                
14 Recent IV estimates of the return to schooling typically exceed the OLS estimates (Card (1998)). Our
framework provides a new explanation of that finding.9
Congress plays several roles in funding research.  The most prominent role is that of
appropriations (Kleinman (1995)).  Both chambers have an appropriation committee responsible
for establishing the budget and allocating discretionary funds. Although the appropriations bill
must be approved by the entire Congress and signed by the President, members on the
appropriations committees have substantial power in establishing the budget.
15  In addition to
widespread anecdotal evidence, there is also systematic evidence that individual Congress
members do influence budget allocations (e.g. Hird (1991), and Rich (1989)).
The appropriations bills fund government agencies and may also “earmark” money to be
used for a special purpose.  Since 1983, earmarking has played a significant role in allocating
funds to universities.  Currently, more than five percent of research funding to universities is
through earmarked funds; in 1998, Congress passed spending measures that included more than
$495 million earmarked projects (Chronicle of Higher Education (1998)). Earmarking provides
additional opportunities for members of the appropriations committees to fund specific schools.
If members have emotional and political ties to their alma maters, we expect schools with
alumni representation on the committees to receive disproportionately more funds than when
there is no alumni representation.  In other words, when an alumni member is appointed to an
appropriations committee, the shadow price of federal research funding falls.  The timing of a
member’s appointment on the appropriations committee is not determined by attributes of the
member’s alma mater.  That is, the fall in the shadow price of funding induced by a member’s
appointment is not caused by changes in other shadow prices or productivity shocks that the
                                                
15 In practice, the President submits a proposed budget to Congress.  The House appropriations committee
reviews and changes the proposed budget and then submits it for review by the Senate appropriations
committee.  The Senate committee plays a role similar to that of an appeals board.  Once both chambers
approve the budget it is then presented to the President for his approval.10
school faces.  Thus, alumni representation on the appropriations committee is arguably a valid
instrument for federal research funding to a school.
To that end, we collected data on congressional membership on the appropriations
committee for both chambers of Congress for the period 1970 to 1996.  Except for the
occurrence of a death or resignation, both committees may change members every two years.
16
For each member that served on the appropriations committee during this period, we identified
the state the member represents, the political party affiliation of the member, the member’s
position on the committee, and the undergraduate alma maters of the member.  With respect to
the member’s position on the committee, there are three possible positions, majority and
minority chair person and general member.  The majority chair is assigned to a member affiliated
with the political party that controls the chamber of Congress for which the members serve; the
minority chair is assigned to a member affiliated with the political party not in control.
With the congressional data, we created six measures, three for each chamber of
Congress.   All of the measures indicate for a given institution whether there are members who
received an undergraduate degree from the university studied.  The first two measures are
dummy variables to indicate whether the member is the majority or minority chair of the
appropriations committee.  The third measure indicates the number of general members on the
committee.  For a school, the number of general members on the committee ranges from 0 to 3;
the average over the universities studied is less than .5 for both chambers.
Because we include year and university fixed effects in all specifications, the above six
measures, when used to explain government funding, will have explanatory power only when
                                                
16 There are elections for both chambers every two years.  In the House, all members must be elected or
re-elected every two years.  In the Senate, one-third of the members are elected or re-elected every two
years since a given member holds office for six years.11
there is a change in one of the six measures for a school in the sample under analysis.  In other
words, the average level of  representation in a school is not exploited in the analysis.
There are 71 research or doctoral universities that experience at least one change in
representation over the period 1972-1994.  The average length in which a school experiences no
change in any of the six congressional dummy variables we use is 7.2 years.  Put another way,
ignoring year effects, our predicted funding for a school keeps the same value for an average of
7.2 years. They change an average of 3.73 times per school over the period studied.
Results from regressing annual federal research expenditures on the congressional
variables for the period 1973-1994 are presented in Table 1.  The data are discussed in detail in
the next section.  There are 71 research or doctoral institutions and an average of 17.5 years of
data for each school.  There is a two year lag between research funding and the congressional
variables. The last two columns of Table 1 indicate for each measure the number of changes and
the number of schools with a change for each measure.
Overall, the F-tests show the congressional variables, as a group, have significant
explanatory power in all regressions. Results are weaker for the log of expenditures. Across
specifications, the most consistent and significant results are the estimates of having alumni as
general members of the House appropriations committee. In the levels specification, the general
member on the House committee increases expenditures by about $2.5 million per year. In logs,
evaluated at the mean, it increases expenditures by 5.1% or $2.9 million.  Since there are more
general members on the house appropriations committee than other kinds of members, a lower
bound estimate of the annual value of having alumni representation on the congressional
appropriation committees is $2.5 million.
17
                                                
17 This value ignores the cost to the school of obtaining these extra funds.12
III Other  Data
The other key data sources are: CASPAR data on federal funding and institutional
characteristics, Institute for Scientific Information data on articles published and citations to
articles published, and Chi Research data on patents issued to universities.
Funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), CASPAR is a compendium of data
sources on higher educational institutions.
18  Data from this source are at the institutional and
academic discipline level and are available on a yearly basis from as far back as 1972.  The
schools are classified under the Carnegie (1994) classification scheme.  We have selected those
schools for which the classification is research or doctoral university.
19  This selection covers
222 institutions.  For the period under analysis, there are 71 universities with changes in their
alumni representation on the congressional appropriations committee.
Table 2 reports the distribution of schools by Carnegie code and ownership status (private
or public) for the entire sample (columns 1 and 2) and for the schools analyzed in this paper
(columns 3 and 4).  The majority of the schools are classified as Research I schools, which are
those considered to be the most research intensive.  Of the schools studied in this paper, 62
percent of the schools are Research I.  With respect to the distribution between public and private
schools, over 60 percent of the schools are public universities.  Table A1 in the Appendix
provides a list of the schools and the number of years for which CASPAR data exists.
                                                
18 An overview of the data can be found at their web site, “www.caspar.nsf.gov”.
19 Research universities are defined as those that offer a full range of baccalaureate programs, are
committed to graduate education through the doctorate, and give high priority to research, awarding at
least 50 doctoral degrees each year.  Doctoral schools differ from Research schools in that they do not
meet minimum requirements with respect to federal support and they may award fewer doctorate degrees.
The Research and Doctoral schools are further divided into classes I and II.  Research I differs from
Research II in that Research I schools receive more than $40 million annually in federal support.
Doctoral I  differs from Doctoral II in that Doctoral I schools must offer at least 40 doctoral degrees in at
least five disciplines; Doctoral II schools must award 20 or more doctorate degrees in at least one
discipline or more than 10 degrees in at least three disciplines.13
The data we gathered from CASPAR for this study cover the following measures at the
institutional level for the period between 1972 and 1994: federal research expenditures, federal
obligations for research in science and engineering, federal contracts, number of faculty, and
faculty salary.  The number of faculty and faculty salary data are missing for all schools for
1974, 1984, 1987, and 1989.  With respect to number of faculty, for the analyses we undertake
using this measure we have estimated the missing faculty data by taking the average of the data
for the year prior and year subsequent to the missing year.
Table 3 reports the means, standard error, minimum, and maximum of the key measures
from the CASPAR data set.   Columns 1 through 4 report the summary measures for all data on
the research and doctoral universities; columns 5 through 8 report the summary measures for the
universities studied.  All dollars are reported in real dollars with 1993 as the base year.  Overall,
the measures for the universities studied are higher than the measures for all universities.  For
example, the average total R&D expenditures from the federal government and other sources for
the universities studied is $89 million; the average for all universities is $53 million.
20  Average
annual federal R&D expenditures for the universities studied is $56 million and ranges between
$36,000 and $426 million.  Federal R&D expenditures represent, on average, 62 percent of total
R&D expenditures.  The average expenditure per faculty is $56,000 with a minimum of less than
$1,000 and a maximum of $414,000.  Average total faculty salary is $49 million, ranging from
$11 to $211 million.  Average salary per faculty is $49,944 and ranges from $34,518 to $80,968.
Data on articles published and citations to articles are provided by the Institute for
Scientific Information.  For each year from 1981 to 1994, we use data at the institutional level
                                                
20 Total R&D expenditures is the sum of expenditures from the federal government, state and local
government, private industry, the university, and other miscellaneous sources.14
for papers published during that year for all disciplines.
21  The articles published are measured
from a set of approximately 4,800 journals.  These data are reported only for the most prolific
universities.  There are 35 universities that have congressional representation and data on articles
published.  Over 90 percent of the schools are Research I universities with more public than
private universities.  Table 4 reports the summary measures for the articles published and
citations to articles published per year.  The average number of articles published per school-year
is 1,761 with an average per faculty member of 1.5.
The citations per article are the total number of citations to articles published in a
particular year, accumulated to 1994, divided by the number of articles published in that year.
Thus, the number of citations per article in earlier years will be higher on average than the
number of citations per article near the end of the sample period; the year fixed effects should
control for this difference.  Within sample, the average number of citations per article is 14.3.
Data on patents cover the period 1975 to 1994 and are provided by Chi Research, Inc.
The data report for 58 of the universities with congressional representation the number of patents
issued to the university on an annual basis.
22  The average number of patents issued per school-
year is 5.8, ranging from 0 to 128 patents per year.  This measure of output has two significant
problems.  First, prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 by Congress, patents could
                                                
21 For some of the article and citation counts the name of the school represents the school system and not
a particular campus.  To address this issue we did the following: if the system for which the school is
attributed has only one major research university then the full value of the measure is attributed to that
university.  If, however, there is more than one major research university affiliated with the system, then
we use the rankings of the National Research Council to weight the measures across the research
universities in the system.  This occurred with two systems, however, only one system is used in our
analysis, the University of Alabama.
22 For some of the patent the name of the school represents the school system and not a particular campus.
As with the articles data, we followed the same methods to address this issue (see previous footnote).  For
the patent data, the problem occurred with ten systems; only five systems are used in our analysis:
University of Alabama, University of California, University of Maryland, University of Texas, and
University of Wisconsin.15
not be issued to universities for federally funding research.  In practice, this often encouraged
scientists to have two lines of parallel research, one that was federally funded and one that was
not, thereby allowing for patents to be issued for the non-federally funded research.  With the
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, federally funded research is now eligible for patents.  To
correct this potential problem in our analysis, we have analyzed the data for the entire period as
well as restrict the analysis to the period subsequent to 1980.
The second problem concerns the incentives set up by the universities with respect to the
distribution of benefits resulting from patents issued to the university.  Historically, universities
were not generous in rewarding its scientists for university owned patents.  So scientists had an
incentive to establish entities separate from the university and seek the issuance of patents
outside of the university. The measure of patents issued to a university is underreported more
severely at those universities with low distributions of benefits.  Many universities have changed
the distribution agreements to encourage scientists to seek patents through the university.  We
have been unable to identify those universities that undertook this change.
Panels A through F of Figure 3 report the four output measures and number of faculty per
year. Articles published have increased over the period studied with a slight dip in the early
1980s.  Patents appear to reflect, in part, the two issues raised above with respect to the
restrictions on federally funded research and the distribution policies of universities. The average
number of patents issued is fairly flat until the early 1980s and then they gradually increase.
IV Results
In all our outcome regressions, we include school and year effects. We will present
results by OLS and IV.  As explained in Section I, a change in the shadow price of federal
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funding affects other inputs.  Without other exogenous measures to explain the other inputs,
including them in the regression is inappropriate.
Our empirical framework assumes that all changes in the shadow price of federally
funded research of the same magnitude, independent of its source, will result in the same
changes in outcomes.  If the funded grants are heterogeneous, this assumption may not be valid.
For example, assume all grants funded by federal granting agencies are the same ex-ante.  Due to
the noisy screening process, some rejected grant applications may be of the same expected
quality as those funded.  Congressional representation means a qualified application from the
represented school has a lower probability of being rejected.  All funded grants, regardless of
congressional intervention, produce the same expected outcomes.  In this case, our instrumental
variable estimator estimates the average outcome due to a fall in the shadow price of funding.
At the other extreme, assume funded grants are not alike ex-ante. The first grant to be
funded is of higher expected quality than the last grant to be funded.  Congressional
representation may induce a lower standard for a grant application to receive funding. In this
case, our instrumental variable estimator provides a lower bound estimate of the average
outcome due to a fall in the shadow price of federal funding.
To be conservative, we will use the first interpretation of our estimator, that it provides an
estimate of the average outcome due to a fall in the shadow price of funding. If funded grants are
ex-ante heterogeneous, our estimator underestimates the average outcome.
Because the appropriate functional form for (11) is not known apriori, we report results
using four linear specifications: levels, level with a control for faculty size, levels per faculty and
logs.
23   If a particular functional form is inadequate, higher order funding will be incorporated in
the error term of that regression.  These higher order terms will be correlated with our17
instruments since our instruments change the shadow price of research funding.  As such, the IV
estimator would be inconsistent.  We use an over-identification (over-id) test as a means to
determine which empirical specification approximates the true specification.  The over-id test
tests the exogeneity of the instruments in the second stage regression.  A high p-value suggests
the instruments belong in the first stage regression but not the second stage regression,
permitting us to estimate the effect of a change in the shadow price of funding on output.  Thus,
we will use a high p-value as an indication of the appropriate specification.
When interpreting the qualitative differences in estimates obtained by lOLS versus lIV, we
assume that var(zjt) and q are both approximately zero. Otherwise, the differences do not have
simple interpretations.
In principle, the specification of lag structures should be an important concern in this
paper because of the lags between funding measures and research outcomes such as publication
and patent counts.  In practice, because our predicted funding measure, attributable to changes in
congressional representation, changes so infrequently, different lag structures have little effect on
our IV estimates.  We report the lag lengths that generate the smallest standard errors.
A.  Effect of Federal Funding on Faculty Salary
The first outcome measure we consider is faculty salary.  Professors have to expend
resources to obtain federal research funding and, thus, it is important to study their pecuniary
benefit from doing so.
24  The number of faculty who receive some form of federal funding at
universities is on the order of 50 percent (NSF (1998)).  Federal research funding may increase
salaries directly if federal grants award stipends as well as indirectly if universities reward
faculty members who bring in more grants.
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In these regressions, we have 71 schools and an average of 17.4 years of data for each
school. We lag federal expenditures by one year and the instruments by three years.  Tables 5
and 6 report the results from the levels and log specifications for OLS and IV, respectively.  The
first stage regressions are reported in Table 1.  For all specifications, the IV estimate of l is
larger than the OLS estimate.  The over-id test is not significant only in column 2, the
specification that includes the number of faculty as a separate regressor.
In column 2, the IV estimate on expenditures is about twice the OLS estimate suggesting
the cross elasticity of demand is positive.  As the shadow price of research funding increases,
demand for it falls causing a direct negative impact on salaries.  Faculty members mitigate this
effect by seeking more of the other inputs.  The IV estimate on expenditures suggests a one
million dollar increase in federal funding will increase total salaries by more than $150,000.  On
average, professors capture 15% of the federal funds they bring into the university.  Due to caps
on research stipends, large grants are likely to have lower pecuniary returns than smaller grants.
The IV estimate of the coefficient on the number of faculty suggests the marginal faculty
member earns $61,740, an amount higher than the average faculty salary of $50,000 reported in
Table 3.  In terms of its effect on total salaries, the marginal faculty member is closer to a senior
professor approaching retirement than a potential new assistant professor.
B.   Effect of Funding on Articles Published
Tables 7 and 8 report the OLS and IV results when the number of articles published is
used as the outcome measure.  This is a traditional measure of research output that universities
and the funding agencies care about.  The analysis of this output measure covers 35 universities
and 490 observations, representing 14 years of data for each university.  For all specifications,
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we lag government expenditures by one year and the instruments by three years.  The results
from the first stage regressions are reported in Table B1 in the Appendix.
Columns 3 and 4 are the two specifications for which the over-id test is satisfied.  In
column 4, the specification reports the regression of the number of articles per faculty member
on the federal expenditures per faculty member.  The OLS estimate suggests an additional 7.9
articles are published for each additional $1 million in federal funding whereas the IV estimate
suggests an additional 12 articles are published.  In Column 3, under a log specification the
results suggest a one percent increase in federal funding will increase articles published by .043
percent under the OLS specification and .199 percent under the IV specification.
On the whole, the results in Table 8 suggest the effect of federal funding on articles
published is higher than the OLS results.  When producing articles, universities substitute toward
other inputs if the shadow price of federal funds increase.  If we use the specification in column
4, the IV coefficient of 12 implies an elasticity number of articles to funding of 0.38 which is
within twice the standard error of the log estimate.
C.  Effect of Federal Funding on Citations to Articles Published
In this section, we use citations per article as the outcome variable. It provides a measure
of the quality of the articles published.  As discussed in the data section, citations per article are
the total number of citations to an article published, accumulated to 1994.  We use year fixed
effects to control for the difference in the number of years covered in the citation counts.
Tables 9 and 10 report the coefficients on federal expenditures for the citations outcome
measure.  Unlike the other outcome measures, the coefficient on federal funding is negative for
the levels specifications.  The coefficients across all specifications are statistically significant.
The over-id test is not rejected in any of the specifications; it is strongest, however, for columns20
3 and 4. Taking the logs specification first (column 3), the IV estimates that the elasticity of
citations with respect to funding is .273. This estimate, along with the point estimate with respect
to the number of articles published, suggest that both the quantity and quality of research
improves as the shadow price of federal research funding falls.
The specification in column 4 uses the per faculty measures in the regression.  The
number of citations per article falls when a school obtains more research funding by -.08.  It
suggests that on average the number of citations to an article falls by something much less than
one, which given the average number of citations per article is roughly 15, suggests a negligible
effect.  These results, combined with the results under the log specification, suggest the tentative
conclusion that when the shadow price of federal funding falls, a school produces more articles
without significant quality change.
D.  The Effect of Federal Funding on Patents
Patents are another measure of research output. Patentable research consists mainly of
applied research in the sciences.  A university also conducts non-patentable research such as
basic research in the sciences, social sciences and humanities disciplines.  Since non-patentable
research also receives federal research support, our estimates of the impact of total federal
research support on patent counts underestimate the efficacy of federal funds in producing
patents.
Tables 11 and 12 report the results under the OLS and IV specifications.  As discussed
earlier, the patent measure contains many zeros.  Following Bound et al. (1984) and Pakes and
Griliches (1984) in their work on patent counts in for profit firms, we do two things in our log
linear specification.  First, we assign the log value for zero as zero and, second, we create a
dummy variable equal to one if the number of patents is zero.  We also report the results under21
the same three levels specification as used with the other types of research outcomes.  In all
specifications, we lag the government funding measure by three years.  In addition, we lag the
congressional measures by six years.  Given the process for getting a patent is lengthy we use a
specification to reflect this length.  We tried other lag lengths and obtained similar results.
In all specifications, the IV estimates are positive and larger than the OLS estimates. In
all four cases, the over-id test is not rejected.  The levels estimates suggests that a $1 million
increase in federal funding would increase the number of patents by .44.  The IV coefficient in
Column 4, using the per faculty specification, is lower than the coefficient reported in Column 1,
suggesting an increase of .34 patent for every additional $1 million in federal funding.
Column 3 reports the results under the modified log specification. The IV coefficient is
1.37 and statistically significant. A one percent increase in federal funding will increase patents
by more than 1 percent. Using the same functional form, estimated elasticities of the number of
patents issued with respect to research expenditure range from .37 to .61 (Bound et al., Pakes and
Griliches).
25  Since the shadow price of federal research funding to society is approximately $1,
the returns, as measured by patent counts, to federal research funding of universities are
comparable to the returns to research expenditure in the private sector.
26
Because of the problem of zeros in the patent data, Tables 13 and 14 analyze the data
under a fixed effects Tobit specification.
27  The coefficients in the Tobit IV specification are
more positive than those in Table 12.  Using the per faculty specification, the coefficient is .506
                                                
25 Two differences should be noted.  First, the specifications differ insofar as the period analyzed and
controls used for heterogeneity.  Second, our results control for other inputs through the use of the IV
specification. In fact our results suggest that their estimates underestimate the true impact.
26 The social cost of federal funds exceeds $1 because the university has to expend resources to obtain
those funds. On the other hand, since not all federal funds are applied to producing patents, this effect will
underestimate the returns.22
suggesting an additional $2 million in funding will increase the number of patents issued by one.
Overall, the results across all of the tables in which patents are used as an outcome measure
suggests an increase in federal funding positively impacts the production of patents.
F.  Robustness Issues
In addition to the regressions reported above there are many other regressions we could
and have run.  We will discuss some of these other regressions below.  In general, however, we
have found the results to be quite robust.
One question is what would happen if we used total R&D expenditures as our measure of
funding instead of federal R&D expenditures.  The primary reason we did not use total
expenditures is that we have focused on the effect of federal funding on research output.  Given,
however, that federal expenditures represent a large portion of total expenditures, we would not
expect there to be much difference in the results.  And, in fact, the coefficients are very similar if
this measure is used.  The standard errors, however, tend to increase.
Another question is what happens if we use other measures for federal funding.  We have
tried two different measures.  The first is federal R&D obligations to Science and Engineering.
Federal obligations to science and engineering are committed dollars (e.g. awarded grants) for
research in science and engineering.  On average the dollars committed are slightly higher than
the expenditures measure.  Presumably the discrepancy between these two measures is from the
method used to report the two measures since expenditures represent actual dollars spent in that
year and obligations represent dollars committed which may be spent over a period of years.
With this measure, the results are similar to those that use federal R&D expenditures.
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one endogenous variable is completely observed and the other truncated.  Honore (1994) provides another
method computing these errors under more relaxed assumptions concerning the distribution of the data.23
The second measure is the funds received under federal contracts.  Federal contracts
represent the dollars received for work performed for the federal government.  On average, the
dollars received from contracts is higher than those received for research.  Federal contracts are
different from the federal R&D expenditures in that under a contract a researcher is expected to
produce very specific work whereas with a research grant the researcher has latitude over her
research projects.
Tables 15 and 16 report the results for our four output measures using federal contracts as
our federal funding measure.  For the articles, citations, and patents we use the per faculty
specification and for the salaries we use the specification that includes the number of faculty as
an exogenous regressor.  With the exception of the citations measure, the coefficients on the
federal contracts measure are positive and significant under both the OLS and IV specifications.
The F-tests on the instruments in the first stage regressions are similar to those reported for the
regressions using federal R&D expenditures.  The coefficients for all of the outputs tend to be
smaller than those reported using the federal R&D expenditures as the federal funding measure.
This suggests that research output benefits more from federal research grants than from federal
contracts, a not too surprising result.
A final issue concerns the potential aggregation of data and whether annual measures are the
proper unit of measurement for the effect of funding on research output.  We ran the regressions
for data that were aggregated over a two-year period.  As discussed earlier, since congressional
representation changes infrequently, the results are very similar to those reported earlier.24
V Conclusion
There are many micro panel studies that have improved our understanding of the effect of
R&D expenditures on outcomes in profit seeking firms.
28  Two related and unresolved problems
in this literature are endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Griliches and Mairesse (1997) have
concluded: “The challenge is to find (instrumental variables) that have genuine information
about factors which affect firms differentially as they choose their input levels”. Our paper is an
attempt in that direction.
Federal R&D funding to universities has risen substantially.  Our results show that this
funding has large measurable short run effects on universities.  Universities are not passive
institutions. They use less federal funds and substitute towards other inputs when the shadow
price of these funds rises.  As a first approximation, when the shadow price of federal research
funds falls, universities produce more research without a significant change in its quality.  When
we use patent counts as our outcome measure, our results suggest that the return to federal R&D
funding of universities is quantitatively comparable to R&D expenditure in the private sector.
                                                
28 E.g. Griliches and Mairesse (1984), Hall (1993), Mairesse and Hall (1996), Bound et. al. (1984), Pakes
and Griliches (1984) and Pakes (1985). A good summary may be found in Griliches (1998).25
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Table 1: Impact of Congress Members’ Alma Maters on Federal Funding
Dependent Variable Per Faculty # of # of Schools
Fed R&D Expenditures Levels Levels Log Member Changes w/ Changes
Majority Senate Leader -1.884 -1.795 -0.061 0.000 11 6
  on Appropriations Comm. (6.457) (6.351) (0.076) (0.004)
Minority Senate Leader 32.572 32.980 -0.092 0.048 53
  on Appropriations Comm. (13.240) (13.403) (0.044) (0.017)
# of Senate General Members 0.133 0.274 -0.002 0.001 78 37
  on Appropriations Comm. (1.033) (1.032) (0.020) (0.001)
Majority House Leader -10.263 -10.207 -0.027 -0.007 11
  on Appropriations Comm. (2.933) (2.909) (0.087) (0.003)
Minority House Leader -9.926 -10.103 -0.205 -0.011 32
  on Appropriations Comm. (3.851) (3.893) (0.085) (0.004)
# of House General Members 2.584 2.379 0.051 0.000 116 51
  on Appropriations Comm. (0.903) (0.896) (0.021) (0.001)
Number of Faculty 0.010
(0.005)
F-test on Instruments 8.130 7.710 4.220 3.800
  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Lag on Instruments 2years 2years 2years 2years
School & Year Fixed Effects yes Yes yes yes
R-Square 0.955 0.955 0.966 0.943
Number of Observations 1239 1239 1239 1239
Number of Schools 71 71 71 71
Note: White corrected standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in
bold are significant less than a p-value of .05.  All regressions included school and year
fixed effects. The last two columns represent the number of changes on the
appropriation committees during the period studied.  A change may be from on to off of
the committee (and vice versa) or a change in membership type (e.g. from general
committee to majority leader).32
Table 2: Distribution of Universities By Carnegie Classification
All Data Analyzed Data
Carnegie Code Private Public Private Public
Research I 30 58 16 28
Research II 9 37 3 10
Doctoral I 21 28 6 2
Doctoral II 17 32 1 5
Total 77 145 26 4533
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Government Funding, Faculty Salary, and Market Endowment
All Data Analyzed Data
Number Mean Minimum Maximum Number Mean Minimum Maximum
of Obs (Std Err) of Obs (Std Err)
Total R&D Expenditures 4839 52.908 0.042 425.868 1606 88.665 0.163 425.868
  (millions of dollars) (0.978) (2.103)
Federal R&D Expenditures 4888 32.927 0.001 284.080 1606 56.001 0.036 284.080
  (millions of dollars) (0.669) (1.473)
Federal R&D Expenditures 4888 0.046 0.000 0.922 1606 0.056 0.000 0.414
  Per Faculty Member (0.001) (0.001)
Federal R&D Obligations 4636 37.476 0.005 401.697 1619 63.646 0.051 401.697
  Science & Engineering (0.764) (1.638)
Federal Contracts 4643 42.170 0.003 489.111 1612 69.170 0.888 489.111
  (millions of dollars) (0.801) (1.743)
Total Faculty Salary 3961 34.400 0.557 211.000 1239 48.602 11.460 210.611
 (millions of dollars) (0.383) (0.782)
Total Faculty Salary 3961 48,220.48 14,514.74 102,520.90 1239 49,944.02 34,517.85 80,967.78
  Per Faculty Member (125.585) (209.481)
Number of Faculty 5403 671.540 4.000 3,258.000 1690 929.668 147.000 3,258.000
(5.874) (11.477)34
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Articles Published, Citations per Articles, and Patents
All Data Analyzed Data
Number Mean Minimum Maximum Number Mean Minimum Maximum
of Obs (Std Err) of Obs (Std Err)
# of Articles Published 1462 1,344.746 0.000 6,802.000 490 1,761.410 297.000 6,802.000
(24.519) (51.216)
# of Articles Published 1426 1.778 0.000 23.647 490 1.533 0.409 4.994
  Per Faculty Member (0.055) (0.041)
# of Citations per Articles Published 1420 14.426 1.235 56.230 490 14.334 1.262 38.630
(0.212) (0.355)
# of Citations per Articles Published 1420 0.025 0.001 0.285 490 0.015 0.001 0.049
  Per Faculty Member (0.001) (0.000)
# of Patents 3105 3.895 0.000 128.000 1155 5.833 0.000 128.000
(0.160) (0.373)
# of Patents 3105 0.005 0.000 0.229 1155 0.005 0.000 0.130
  Per Faculty Member (0.000) (0.000)35
Table 5: Relationship Between Faculty Salary and Federal Funding, OLS
Dependent Variable: Per Faculty
Total Faculty Salary Levels Levels Log Member
Federal R&D Expenditures 120076.0 76591.0 0.034 28041.0
(millions of dollars) (21813.3) (8723.0) (0.013) (9704.2)
Number of Faculty 62490.6
(2212.4)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year
R-Square 0.929 0.986 0.967 0.871
Number of Observations 1239 1239 1239 1239
Number of Schools 71 71 71 71
Table 6: Relationship Between Faculty Salary and Federal Funding, IV
Dependent Variable Per Faculty
Total Faculty Salary Levels Levels Log Member
Fed R&D Expenditures 193261.0 152015.0 0.041 132150.0
(millions of dollars) (62719.0) (27257.0) (0.114) (22143.5)
Number of Faculty 61740.4
(2245.6)
F-test on Instruments 8.130 7.710 4.220 3.800
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000)
Over-Identification Test 2.367 0.901 4.117 3.883
(p-value) (0.038) (0.480) (0.001) (0.002)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year
Lag on Instruments 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
R-Square 0.928 0.985 0.967 0.843
Number of Observations 1239 1239 1239 1239
Number of Schools 71 71 71 71
Note: White corrected standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in
bold are significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year
fixed effects.36
Table 7: Relationship Between Articles Published and Federal Funding, OLS
Dependent Variable Per Faculty
# of Articles Published Levels Levels Log Member
Fed R&D Expenditures 7.436 6.903 0.043 7.933
(millions of dollars) (0.540) (0.495) (0.025) (0.995)
Number of Faculty 0.351
(0.161)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year
R-Square 0.987 0.988 0.994 0.983
Number of Observations 490 490 490 490
Number of Schools 35 35 35 35
Table 8: Relationship Between Articles Published and Federal Funding, IV
Dependent Variable Per Faculty
# of Articles Published Levels Levels Log Member
Fed R&D Expenditures 10.568 10.261 0.199 12.024
  (millions of dollars) (3.870) (3.740) (0.101) (2.438)
Number of Faculty 0.296
(0.154)
F-test on Instruments 5.750 5.440 7.310 3.220
  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
Over-Identification Test 5.122 4.573 0.437 1.468
  (p-value) (0.000) (0.001) (0.823) (0.200)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year
Lag on Instruments 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
R-Square 0.986 0.987 0.992 0.980
Number of Observations 490 490 490 490
Number of Schools 35 35 35 35
Note: White corrected standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in
bold are significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year
fixed effects.37
Table 9: Relationship Between Citations Per Article Published and Federal Funding, OLS
Dependent Variable: Per Faculty
Citations to Articles Published Levels Levels Log Member
Federal R&D Expenditures -0.084 -0.083 0.055 -0.068
  (millions of dollars) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.019)
Number of Faculty -0.000
(0.001)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year
R-Square 0.931 0.931 0.988 0.901
Number of Observations 490 490 490 490
Number of Schools 35 35 35 35
Table 10: Relationship Between Citations Per Articles Published and Federal Funding, IV
Dependent Variable: Per Faculty
Citations to Articles Published Levels Levels Log Member
Federal R&D Expenditures -0.202 -0.200 0.273 -0.084
  (millions of dollars) (0.056) (0.057) (0.126) (0.049)
Number of Faculty .002
(0.001)
F-test on Instruments 5.750 5.440 7.310 3.220
  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
Over-Identification Test 1.675 1.683 0.386 0.321
  (p-value) (0.140) (0.138) (0.858) (0.900)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year
Lag on Instruments 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
R-Square 0.905 0.906 0.986 0.901
Number of Observations 490 490 490 490
Number of Schools 35 35 35 35
Note: White corrected standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in
bold are significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year
fixed effects.38
Table 11: Relationship Between  Patents and Federal Funding, OLS
Dependent Variable: Per Faculty
# of Patents Received Levels Levels Log Member
Federal R&D Expenditures 0.227 0.223 0.036 0.159
  (millions of dollars) (0.021) (0.021) (0.056) (0.019)
Number of Faculty 0.004
(0.003)
Dummy = 1 if Patent =0 -0.536
(0.049)
Lag on Government Funding 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
R-Square 0.809 0.810 0.802 0.818
Number of Observations 1155 1155 1155 1155
Number of Schools 58 58 58 58
Table 12: Relationship Between  Patents and Federal Funding, IV
Dependent Variable Per Faculty
# of Patents Received Levels Levels Log Member
Federal R&D Expenditures 0.436 0.428 1.366 0.342
  (millions of dollars) (0.075) (0.075) (0.438) (0.075)
Number of Faculty 0.001
(0.003)
Dummy = 1 if Patent =0 -0.413
(0.069)
F-test on Instruments 10.590 9.610 7.250 6.180
  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Over-Identification Test 0.708 0.706 1.445 1.014
  (p-value) (0.618) (0.619) (0.206) (0.408)
Lag on Government Funding 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
Lag on Instruments 6 years 6 years 6 years 6 years
R-Square 0.773 0.756 0.723 0.782
Number of Observations 1155 1155 1155 1155
Number of Schools 58 58 58 58
Note: White corrected standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in
bold are significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year
fixed effects.39
Table 13: Relationship Between  Patents and Federal Funding, Tobit
Dependent Variable: Per Faculty
# of Patents Received Levels Levels Member
Federal R&D Expenditures 0.215 0.210 0.164
  (millions of dollars) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016)
Number of Faculty 0.002
(0.002)
Lag on Government Funding 3 years 3 years 3 years
Number of Observations 1155 1155 1195
Number of Schools 58 58 58
Table 14: Relationship Between  Patents and Federal Funding, IV Tobit
Dependent Variable Per Faculty
# of Patents Received Levels Levels Member
Federal R&D Expenditures 0.659 0.642 0.506
  (millions of dollars) (0.449) (0.462) (0.120)
Number of Faculty -0.003
(2.90)
Lag on Government Funding 3 years 3 years 3 years
Lag on Instruments 6 years 6 years 6 years
Number of Observations 1155 1155 1155
Number of Schools 58 58 58
Note: Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in bold are
significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year fixed
effects.40
Table 15: Relationship Between Research Output and Federal Contracts, OLS
Dependent Variable
Per Faculty Specification Articles Citations Patents Salaries
Federal Contracts 5.485 -0.036 0.069 32908.0
  (millions of dollars) (0.651) (0.012) (0.013) (6867.0)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 3 years 1 year
Specification Per Faculty Per Faculty Per Faculty # of Faculty
Included
R-Square 0.983 0.899 0.812 0.986
Number of Observations 490 490 1188 1373
Number of Schools 35 35 60 71
Table 16: Relationship Between Research Output and Federal Contracts, IV
Dependent Variable
Per Faculty Specification Articles Citations Patents Salaries
Federal Contracts 6.591 -0.042 0.151 57232.0
  (millions of dollars) (1.225) (0.026) (0.033) (14390.9)
F-test on Instruments 3.280 3.280 5.530 5.530
  (p-value) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
Over-Identification Test 0.916 0.418 1.139 2.653
  (p-value) (0.471) (0.837) (0.338) (0.022)
Lag on Government Funding 1 year 1 year 3 years 1 year
Lag on Instruments 3 years 3 years 6 years 3 years
Specification Per Faculty Per Faculty Per Faculty # of Faculty
Included
R-Square 0.983 0.899 0.789 0.978
Number of Observations 490 490 1189 1373
Number of Schools 35 35 60 71
Note: Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in bold are
significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year fixed effects.41
Table A1:  Research and Academic Institutions Analyzed
State University Congress Salary Articles Patent
Rep # years # years # years
Alabama University of Alabama 3 18 11 17
Arizona Arizona State University 3 19 11 17
University of Arizona 2 19 0 17
California San Diego State University 2 19 0 0
Stanford University 3 17 11 17
University of California-Berkeley 2 17 11 17
University of California-Los Angeles 3 17 11 17
 Colorado University of Denver 2 19 0 17
University of Colorado 1 19 0 17
Connecticut Yale University 3 17 11 17
D.C. American University 1 19 0 0
Catholic University of America 2 19 0 17
George Washington University 2 19 0 17
Georgetown University 3 17 11 17
Howard University 2 18 0 17
Florida Florida State University 3 19 11 17
University of Florida 3 19 11 17
Georgia Emory University 1 18 0 17
University of Georgia 3 19 11 17
Hawaii University of Hawaii at Manoa 2 18 11 0
Iowa Iowa State University 2 19 11 0
Idaho University of Idaho 1 19 0 0
Illinois Northwestern University 3 19 11 17
University of Chicago 2 16 0 17
Indiana University of Notre Dame 2 19 0 17
Purdue University 3 19 11 17
Kansas Kansas State University 2 19 0 17
Kentucky University of Kentucky 3 19 11 17
Louisiana Tulane University 2 19 0 17
Massachusetts Boston College 2 19 0 17
Harvard University 3 18 11 17
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3 19 11 17
Maryland University of Maryland at College Park 3 19 11 17
Michigan Michigan State University 2 19 0 17
University of Michigan 1 19 0 17
Minnesota University of Minnesota 1 19 0 0
Mississippi Mississippi State University 2 19 0 17
University of Mississippi 2 19 0 17
North Carolina Duke University 1 10 0 17
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2 19 11 0
North Dakota North Dakota State University 2 19 0 17
Nebraska University of Nebraska at Lincoln 2 19 11 0
New Hampshire University of New Hampshire 2 19 0 17
Note:  Congress Rep indicates for which output measures the membership on the committee changes
during the period analyzed. 1= Salary Only; 2=Salary and Patents Only; 3= Salary, Patent & Articles
The other measures indicates the number of years which we analyze.42
Table A1: Continued
State University Congress Salary Articles Patent
Rep # years # years # years
New Jersey Princeton University 3 19 11 17
New Mexico University of New Mexico 3 19 11 17
New York Columbia University 3 19 11 17
Fordham University 1 19 0 0
New York University 3 19 11 0
Cornell University 3 19 11 17
Syracuse University 3 19 11 17
Ohio Cleveland State University 1 19 0 17
 Oklahoma Oklahoma State University 2 19 0 17
University of Oklahoma 1 19 0 0
Oregon Oregon State University 2 19 0 17
University of Oregon 2 19 0 17
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania State University 3 19 11 17
University of Pittsburgh 2 19 0 17
South Carolina University of South Carolina 1 19 0 17
Tennessee Middle Tennessee State University 1 2 0 0
Vanderbilt University 3 19 11 17
Texas Southern Methodist University 2 19 0 17
University of Houston 2 19 0 17
University of Texas at Austin 3 19 11 17
Baylor University 2 19 0 17
Utah University of Utah 2 19 11 17
Utah State University 3 19 11 17
Virginia Virginia Polytechnic Institute 3 19 11 17
College of William and Mary 2 19 0 0
Vermont University of Vermont 3 19 11 17
Washington University of Washington 3 19 11 17
Wisconsin University of Wisconsin-Madison 3 19 11 17
Note:  Congress Rep indicates for which output measures the membership on the committee changes
during the period analyzed. 1= Salary Only; 2=Salary and Patents Only; 3= Salary, Patent & Articles
The other measures indicates the number of years which we analyze.43
Table A2:  Research and Academic Institutions Not Analyzed
State University Congress Salary Articles Patent
Rep # years # years # years
Alaska University of AK Fairbanks 1 16 0 0
Alabama University of Alabama at Birmingham 1 19 11 17
University of Alabama in Huntsville 0 19 11 0
Auburn University 0 19 0 17
Arkansas University of Arkansas, Main Campus 0 19 0 0
Arizona Northern Arizona University 0 19 0 0
California University of San Diego 0 2 0 0
California Institute of Technology 0 19 11 17
United States International University 0 1 0 1
Claremont Graduate School 0 18 0 0
Loma Linda University 0 12 0 11
Pepperdine University 0 0 0 16
University of California-Davis 0 17 11 17
University of California-Irvine 0 17 11 17
University of California-Riverside 0 17 11 17
University of California-San Diego 0 17 11 17
University of California-San Francisco 0 17 11 17
University of California-Santa Barbara 0 17 11 17
University of California-Santa Cruz 0 17 11 17
University of San Francisco 0 15 0 0
University of Southern California 1 18 10 16
University of the Pacific 0 19 0 0
Colorado Colorado School of Mines 0 19 0 0
University of Northern Colorado 0 5 0 0
Colorado State University 0 18 11 17
Connecticut University of Connecticut 0 19 11 117
Delaware University of Delaware 0 19 11 17
Florida Florida Institute of Technology 0 19 0 0
Florida Atlantic University 0 18 0 17
Nova Southeastern University 0 19 0 0
University of Miami 0 19 11 17
University of South Florida 0 19 0 17
University of Central Florida 0 18 0 17
Florida International University 0 2 0 17
Georgia Clark Atlanta University 0 18 0 0
Georgia State University 0 19 0 17
Georgia Institute of Technology 0 19 11 17
Iowa University of Iowa 1 19 11 17
Idaho Idaho State University 0 19 0 0
Illinois De Paul University 0 19 0 0
Illinois Institute of Technology 0 19 0 0
Illinois State University 0 19 0 17
Loyola University of Chicago 0 19 11 17
Northern Illinois University 0 18 0 17
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale 0 19 0 17
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 0 19 11 17
University of Illinois at Chicago 0 19 11 1744
Table A2: Continued
State University Congress Salary Articles Patent
Rep # years # years # years
Indiana Ball State University 0 19 0 17
Indiana State University 1 19 0 0
Indiana University 1 19 0 0
Kansas Wichita State University 0 19 0 17
University of Kansas 0 19 11 17
Kentucky University of Louisville 0 19 0 17
Louisiana Louisiana Tech University 0 19 0 0
University of New Orleans 0 9 0 17
University of Southwestern Louisiana 0 14 0 17
Louisiana State University 1 1 0 0
Massachusetts Boston University 1 17 11 17
Brandeis University 0 19 11 17
Clark University 0 19 0 17
University of Massachusetts Lowell 0 18 0 0
Northeastern University 0 16 0 17
Tufts University 0 19 11 17
University of Massachusetts at Amherst 0 14 0 0
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 0 19 0 17
Maryland Johns Hopkins University 0 19 11 17
University of Maryland Baltimore County 0 16 0 0
Maine University of Maine 0 19 0 0
Michigan Andrews University 0 11 0 0
Michigan Technological University 0 19 0 17
University of Detroit Mercy 0 19 0 0
Wayne State University 0 16 11 17
Western Michigan University 0 19 0 0
Missouri University of Missouri, Columbia 0 18 0 0
University of Missouri, Rolla 0 18 0 0
University of Missouri, Kansas City 0 18 0 0
University of Missouri, St Louis 0 18 0 0
Washington University 0 19 11 17
St Louis University 0 19 0 17
Mississippi University of Southern Mississippi 0 22 0 20
Montana Montana State University 0 19 0 17
University of Montana 0 19 0 17
North Carolina North Carolina State University at Raleigh 0 18 11 17
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 0 19 0 0
Wake Forest University 0 19 11 17
North Dakota University of North Dakota 0 19 0 17
New Hampshire Dartmouth College 0 19 11 17
New Jersey New Jersey Institute Technology 0 18 0 17
Seton Hall University 0 18 0 0
Stevens Institute of Technology 0 19 0 17
Rutgers the State Univ of NJ 0 18 11 1745
Table A2: Continued
State University Congress Salary Articles Patent
Rep # years # years # years
New Mexico New Mexico State University 0 19 11 17
Nevada University of Nevada-Reno 0 19 0 0
New York Adelphi University 0 18 0 0
Clarkson University 0 19 0 17
Hofstra University 0 19 0 17
Polytechnic University 0 18 0 0
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 0 19 0 17
Rockefeller University 0 13 6 12
St John’s University 0 19 0 0
SUNY at Albany 0 19 0 0
SUNY at Binghamton 0 19 0 0
University of Rochester 0 18 11 17
Yeshiva University 0 18 0 0
Teachers College, Columbia University 0 16 0 0
CUNY Graduate School and University 0 16 0 0
Pace University 0 0 0 17
SUNY at Buffalo 0 19 0 0
SUNY at Stony Brook 0 18 0 0
Ohio University of Akron 0 14 0 13
Case Western Reserve University 0 19 11 17
University of Toledo 0 19 0 17
Bowling Green State University 0 18 0 17
Kent State University 0 19 0 17
Miami University 0 19 0 0
Ohio State University 0 19 11 17
Ohio University 0 19 0 17
University of Cincinnati 0 18 11 17
Wright State University 0 19 0 17
Oklahoma University of Tulsa 0 19 0 0
Oregon Portland State University 0 18 0 0
Pennsylvania Carnegie Mellon University 0 19 11 17
Drexel University 0 19 0 17
Duquesne University 0 18 0 17
Lehigh University 0 19 11 17
Temple University 0 19 0 17
Indiana University of PA 0 2 0 0
University of Pennsylvania 0 18 11 17
Rhode Island Brown University 0 19 11 17
University of Rhode Island 0 19 0 17
South Carolina Clemson University 0 19 0 17
South Dakota University of South Dakota 0 19 0 0
Tennessee University of Memphis 0 19 0 0
Tennessee State University 0 17 0 0
University of Tennessee at Knoxville 0 6 0 046
Table A2: Continued
State University Congress Salary Articles Patent
Rep # years # years # years
Texas East Texas State University 0 11 0 0
University of North TX 0 19 0 17
Rice University 0 19 11 17
Texas Christian University 0 19 0 0
Texas Southern University 0 17 0 0
Texas Tech University 0 19 0 17
Texas Woman’s University 0 19 0 0
University of Texas at Arlington 0 19 0 17
University of Texas at Dallas 0 14 11 0
Virginia Old Dominion University 0 19 0 17
Virginia Commonwealth University 0 19 11 17
University of Virginia 1 19 11 17
George Mason University 0 18 0 17
Washington Washington State University 0 19 11 17
Wisconsin Marquette University 0 19 0 17
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 0 19 0 0
West Virginia West Virginia University 0 19 11 17
Wyoming University of Wyoming 0 19 0 17
Note: Congress Rep indicates whether there was representation on the appropriations committee over
the entire sample period.47
Table B1: First Stage Regressions for Articles and Citations
Dependent Variable Per Faculty # of # of Schools
Fed R&D Expenditures Levels Levels Log Member Changes w/ Changes
Majority Senate Leader 0.883 0.986 0.074 0.005 3 2
  on Appropriations Comm. (11.847) (11.707) (0.029) (0.010)
Minority Senate Leader 14.572 17.296 -0.031 0.045 3 2
  on Appropriations Comm. (11.913) (11.979) (0.044) (0.014)
# of Senate General Members -1.939 -1.661 -0.041 -0.001 30 19
  on Appropriations Comm. (1.801) (1.766) (0.022) (0.002)
# of House General Members 5.351 5.131 -0.057 0.002 39 23
  on Appropriations Comm. (1.241) (1.252) (0.022) (0.001)
Number of Faculty 0.018
(0.006)
F-test on Instruments 5.750 5.440 7.310 3.22
  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0126)
Lag on Instruments 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years
R-Square 0.976 0.977 0.974 0.971
Number of Observations 490 490 490 490
Number of Schools 35 35 35 35
Note: Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in bold are
significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year fixed
effects.  The last two columns represent the number of changes on the appropriation
committees during the period studied.  A change may be from on to off of the committee
(and vice versa) or a change in membership type (e.g. from general committee to
majority leader).48
Table B2: First Stage Regressions for Patents
Dependent Variable Per Faculty # of # of Schools
Fed R&D Expenditures Levels Levels Log Member Changes w/ Changes
Majority Senate Leader 21.117 22.306 0.114 0.029 95
on Appropriations Comm. (7.700) (7.601) (0.040) (0.009)
Minority Senate Leader 8.906 10.009 -0.054 0.019 5 3
on Appropriations Comm. (10.612) (10.699) (0.039) (0.014)
# of Senate General Members 0.743 0.665 0.010 0.001 63 28
on Appropriations Comm. (1.042) (1.034) (0.021) (0.001)
Majority House Leader -11.360 -10.577 -0.075 -0.007 11
on Appropriations Comm. (2.685) (2.589) (0.077) (0.003)
Minority House Leader -13.252 -13.133 -0.314 -0.011 11
on Appropriations Comm. (3.097) (3.029) (0.080) (0.003)
# of House General Members 2.176 1.770 0.055 0.001 103 46
on Appropriations Comm. (0.817) (0.833) (0.018) (0.001)
Number of Faculty 0.017
(0.004)
Dummy = 1 if Patent =0 -0.085
(0.025)
F-test on Instruments 10.590 9.610 7.250 6.180
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag on Instruments 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
R-Square 0.964 0.964 0.968 0.949
Number of Observations 1155 1155 1155 1155
Number of Schools 58 60 60 60
Note: Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted.  Coefficients in bold are
significant less than a p-value of .05. All regressions included school and year fixed
effects. The last two columns represent the number of changes on the appropriation
committees during the period studied.  A change may be from on to off of the committee
(and vice versa) or a change in membership type (e.g. from general committee to
majority leader).